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JPRS L/9801

19 June 1981

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 726



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FATE OF CHAD, LIBYA 'CLOSELY LINKED' UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 Apr 81 pp 22-24

[Article by Ginette Cot: "GUNT Is Gaining Ground but Situation Remains Perilous"]

[Text] The arguments advanced by Paris' allies to foster continued tension over the Chadian situation and rekindle war in that country ravaged by a succession of crises and armed conflicts, have collapsed one after another with every passing week. And now at a time when the Elysee Palace--where France's African policy is determined--is paralyzed by preparations for the presidential election, everything seems to be happening as if, on the eve of the OAU summit, there is a veritable race against time between the GUNT [Transitional Government of National Unity], which is gaining ground, and its enemies, namely those who are prepared to do anything to reverse the situation created by the rout of Hissein Habre's forces at Ndjamena on 15 December 1980, and return Chad to the bosom of the former mother country whose dangerous game is becoming more and more obvious.

To the great displeasure of its detractors, while Chad's Transitional Government of National Unity, headed by Goukouni Weddeye, has been making points--despite an unfavorable conjuncture--on the diplomatic level outside the country, it has also been demonstrating its capability to control and stabilize the situation inside the country, despite its crippling handicaps and meager resources. Those persons who shouted "fire" some 4 months ago after the release of a communique on 6 January in Tripoli, now find they went to all that trouble for nothing. Although the communique in question did refer to a "mass union" between the Libyan and Chadian peoples through their history and struggles, it nevertheless also highlighted Tripoli's desire to help Ndjamena rebuild its national structures and defend its independence. Yet there were critics some who had scurrilously misinterpreted that communique for the sake of a disreputable cause. And those persons who are today talking about a "turnabout" are dishonest because they had in general totally ignored the first official statement issued by the GUNT which, as early as 15 January, had made things quite clear. The fact remains--and this is the important point--that after the multiple clarifications issued in both capitals, the pretext of an alleged merger plan can no longer be used convincingly to denounce the GUNT or accuse Tripoli of planning to "swallow up" Chad. Moreover, the recent statements by Acyl Ahmat, still depicted as an unwavering supporter of Tripoli, have seemingly helped to calm the latest public unrest fomented around this false issue. When questioned on 27 March about this matter, the Chadian foreign minister explained that a democratically elected government will have to succeed the provisional government as soon as there is the necessary combination of conditions and resources conducive to holding elections. It is only afterwards, he added, that the question of a merger with Libya could possibly be submitted to the Chadian people in a referendum.

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Quieting Assurances

Tripoli has also been busily issuing quieting assurances. For example, during a visit to Ndjamena for the purpose of arranging a Libyan financial and economic assistance program for the GUNT, Major Abdessalam Jalloud not only reaffirmed the Jamahiriya's definite commitment to support the Chadian people economically and politically, but also stated: "We are making no demands on any African state. We do not claim to be protectors. We have no disputes with any African state, for we desire only peace, security, and stability.... The Libyan military presence in Chad was in response to the request of the legal government pursuant to the decisions of the Lagos conference.... The Libyan forces will be withdrawn whenever the legitimate Chadian Government so requests."

Also fruitless were the explicit and repeated appeals made to Colonel Kamougue, the GUNT's vice president, in an effort to persuade him to lead southern Chad recklessly into rebellion and secession. And as if all dangers could be removed through a sort of Coueism, opinion-makers have continued to spread alarmist reports about the dangerous increase in tension within Ndjamena's governmental coalition. Yet, here again, it is a well-known fact that all speculation on this particular subject was dramatically quelled by the lengthy tour of the country the president of the GUNT began on 10 March. The southern provinces were his priority objective, ahead of the eastern region, on this nationwide tour, the first made by a Chadian chief of state in 3 years. The population of the five southern prefectures did, in fact, give President Goukouni Weddeye an enthusiastic reception. Colonel Kamougue organized this trip and was responsible for all its security arrangements. During a week of meetings and talks, the GUNT leader, accompanied by an imposing delegation, was able to exchange views on all problems facing the country with the leaders and people of this "useful", "animistic", and "Christian" south.

This tour strikingly demonstrated the Chadian people's longing for national unity and peace, and also the authority and following which President Goukouni Weddeye and his government have gained. This latter development is a new factor which augurs well for the future, when one recalls the prevailing atmosphere of delinquency, internal dissension, and despair following the constitution of the GUNT in November 1979, and likewise immediately before Ndjamena's second civil war in March 1980.

The president's proposals and assurances given during this visit evoked a largely favorable and sympathetic response among the people of the country's southern region. These proposals and assurances dealt with such matters as the necessarily secular character of the state, future organization of free elections, essential reestablishment of government authority in those regions still administered by the various GUNT factions, payment of salaries, starting at the end of March, to all officials forced to flee to the south, absence of a plan for an organic merger with Tripoli, and the prospective withdrawal of Libyan forces as soon as Chad's security is firmly established and the national army reconstituted.

Restore Confidence

Upon completion of the president's tour, the GUNT adopted measures designed to restore confidence and help dispel the resentment created by the successive wars that have torn the country asunder. One such measure is the decision to repatriate

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to their southern native provinces some 150 former prisoners of war from the former Chadian governmental national army--defeated during the fighting in 1978-1979--and kept up to now in the Abeche region where they were assigned to various tasks. Lastly, the government is busily taking concrete action to implement the vital plan for demilitarization of the capital. In fact, it was pursuant to this plan that 200 Libyan soldiers were relieved of their control duties at the Ndjamenan airport on 26 March and returned to Libya. By this measure, both the Libyan and Chadian parties demonstrated at the same time their determination to make their actions and promises agree, in other words, to proceed progressively with Tripoli's military disengagement from Chad as threats to the restored but still shaky peace, and consequently to the country's independence and territorial integrity, are gradually removed.

Yet it goes without saying that one of the most formidable and most vital tasks facing the GUNT is to get the country's administrative, economic, and financial machinery back in operation. These services were totally dismantled during the most recent fighting. Moreover, this national reconstruction program, without which the normalization process now underway would remain vulnerable, cannot be successfully implemented without external assistance. Yet it must be acknowledged that, thus far, only Libya, already militarily and politically engaged alongside Chad, has responded to the GUNT's appeal by furnishing aid in various fields. When Major Jalloud visited Ndjamenan on 12-14 February--a visit that concluded with the publication of a communique affirming that the Chadian people needed to become "complete master of its destiny through Chadian national unity"--he discussed a large-scale national reconstruction program. This program notably calls for the resumption of projects in such fields of activity as banking, agricultural and industrial development, transportation, and communications. Also discussed were long-term contracts for the purchase of Chad's cotton crop, loans to farmers amounting to 50-100 million dollars, and investment projects which could create 4,000 to 5,000 jobs in Ndjamenan. For the country's more immediate needs, Tripoli has promised to grant financial aid with which to pay government civilian employees as well as the soldiers of the future integrated national army, and also to help reopen the Chadian Central Bank.

Furthermore, a United Nations mission arrived in Ndjamenan in March to study the possibilities of support from that international organization. But after the UN experts had completed their survey, it was emphasized that none of the measures considered could be put into effect for the moment and that everything would depend on "how the domestic situation developed." This condition is indicative of the magnitude of the pressures to which Chad could continue to be subjected, even if only indirectly through the "freeze" on any initiative of solidarity.

For that matter, France persists in turning a deaf ear to the GUNT's repeated appeals. At the same time that France is doing its utmost to rekindle the civil war, it is also obviously counting on the possible ineffectiveness or inadequacy of Libyan cooperation and on Chad's economic and financial "strangulation" to achieve its goals of "restabilizing" the country. The GUNT has made vain requests for the reopening of the French Embassy in the Chadian capital. In addition, authorities in Ndjamenan have repeatedly affirmed--President Goukouni Weddeye reiterated it once again during his southern tour--their desire not to bind Chad's relations to one exclusive partner, but, on the contrary, to develop sincere cooperation with all countries, including France.

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"Realistic" Current of Opinion

In French business circles, however, there are some who wonder whether it would not be ultimately more profitable, and even in the former mother country's own interest, to contribute to Chad's reconstruction effort rather than openly leave this task to the others and fan the embers so as to rekindle war in that country where, after so much suffering and destruction, the people now yearn solely for peace and national unity. This same "realistic" current of opinion--whose views may possibly receive a sympathetic response depending on the outcome of the French presidential election--questions whether continuing to follow a revanchist course of action by encouraging the "Habrists" [Habre's followers] and perpetuating the blackmail-like threat of possible "anti-Libyan military intervention" is not the best way of driving Chad completely into the enemy camp, in other words, tilting it into "the Soviet orbit," according to the popular simplistic Manichean schema which permits dodging any reference to the real reasons for the troubles plaguing Chad.

In any case, the evolution of French policy toward the Chadian situation will not be able to ignore the consensus that will emerge on this subject within the OAU. It is a known fact that even when the hysterical campaign launched in January over publication of the Tripoli communique on the alleged "merger" had reached its highest pitch, Giscardian France had not succeeded in obtaining full acceptance of its views at the Lome conference, despite the fact that it had been instrumental in organizing the conference and that Elysee Palace emissaries had maneuvered its deliberations. Admittedly some "vicious" resolutions--which very quickly proved to be unrealizable--unfavorable to the GUNT and Tripoli had been adopted during this hastily convened summit conference from which the Chadians themselves were absent. And it was this aspect of the resolutions that had been highlighted. But every effort was made--and for obvious reasons--to keep practically secret the fact that although the Lome conference did ask "the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and other powers having troops and military advisers stationed on Chadian territory to withdraw them immediately," it likewise demanded at the same time that "all OAU members, especially those countries bordering on Chad, deny extra-African powers and Chadian dissidents any use of their territories as sanctuaries or bases from which to launch armed attacks against the Republic of Chad."

It is clearly apparent that the anxieties which prompted the latter demand are currently taking greater and greater precedence over Libya's alleged "hegemonistic threats." This growing recognition of how dangerous French aims in Africa are to the continent's independence, future, and security is what undoubtedly explains why the diehards of revanchism had their hopes dashed at recent major inter-African conferences. In fact, the 17-19 February Conference of Saharan States in Algiers produced no startling statements hostile to the GUNT, nor did the OAU ministerial meeting held a few days later. It will also be recalled that Liberia's attempt to bring the Chadian issue before the United Nations failed miserably. Though the confusion fostered around the Chadian problem has far from dissipated, and although analyses of and approaches to the problem do differ--as confirmed by the prudent way the issue is dealt with in joint reactions--it is clear that the French stance on the subject is losing ground.

Habre's Appeals

Nevertheless, there can be no illusions about the steadily mounting perils facing Libya and Chad. Under the present circumstances, the fate of both countries appears

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to be closely linked. Nor is it by chance that, some 2 months prior to the OAU summit scheduled to meet in Kampala this July--at which Cairo has served notice it will bring up the Chadian-Libyan question--Hissein Habre has renewed his appeals for yet another "war of liberation" in Chad and has once again become the subject of flashy publicity. The objectives of "France's man" are easily discernible: block the current normalization effort in Chad, foment troubles serious enough to sow discord, once again, at the Kampala summit and have the "Habristes" recognized as a real factor to be considered during the debates on the Chadian situation. Kolbous, a small village near the Chadian border in the Sudan's mountainous Darfur region, appears to have a role similar to the one which the Cameroonian village of Kousseri played during Ndjamenas's second civil war. Hissein Habre, with the powerful assistance of Egypt--the bridgehead for the combat force now being organized--has established his headquarters in Kolbous which is reported to have sheltered some 5,000 to 10,000 Chadian refugees since December 1980. Tendentious reporters go there to "query" their sources of "information" on the situation in Chad and prepare their sensational "scoops." And it is from Kolbous that the former "rebel" of the Tibesti region--who already had himself called "president" during the latest Ndjamenas war for which he bears a heavy responsibility--directs subversive attacks against the GUNT forces. It is doubtful that the Sudan, whose situation is more than vulnerable, can, without running the risk of new internal upheavals, long tolerate the presence of this bothersome "rebellion" and get itself too involved in joining that Western anti-GUNT and anti-Libyan front now being organized. But Sadat's Egypt, of which Khartoum is the vassal, has the strong backing of Washington and Paris, and shows that it is prepared to go all-out in a venture that would enable it to try to kill two birds with one stone: reserve the situation in Chad, a country guilty of wanting to control its own destiny outside the protection of French imperialism; and overthrow the Qadhdhafi regime whose decisive contribution to the outcome of the most recent Chadian crisis has offered new prospects for the struggles of the African people.

Lastly, the hundreds of soldiers assigned to operation "Barracuda" and stationed near Chad's southern border do not have solely the mission of preserving Giscardian France's status quo in the Central African Republic. It certainly looks as if Chad is one of their primary objectives. Maps of that country predominate on the walls of the "Barracuda" command post on the base at Bouar--some 190 kilometers from Ndjamenas--where all possible "data" on a military operation against Chad have been studied. In this connection, a reportage on the Bouar base in the Central African Republic published last February in a French newspaper is highly revealing. Following a discussion with "Barracuda" officers, the reporter wrote: "To put it plainly, if they receive the order to attack, and provided they are reinforced by a few additional paratroop companies--Bouar is a 5-hour trip by plane from Solenzara, the 2d REP's [Foreign (Legion) Paratroop Regiment] Corsican airport--, French military officers in Bangui estimate it would take them from 3 to 5 days to defeat the 5,000 Libyans occupying Chad. Everything has been studied, planned, and estimated, even the number of casualties, which would be heavy, 300 French troops killed."

False Cleavages

Under these conditions, we can see only too clearly the importance of the stakes involved, not only for the Chadian and Libyan peoples, but all peoples of the continent, in the race against time between the GUNT and its allies on the one side and the warmongers on the other.

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The latter are prepared to put Africa to fire and the sword in order to perpetuate imperialism's rule over this part of the world, a type of rule which primarily means pillage.

Equally only too obvious are the tremendous dangers, mortal dangers for the continent, which can be created by an analysis of the Chadian situation widely propagated by the Western media, an analysis which, to further the objectives of a strategy of reconquest, tends to reduce the tensions generated by that strategy to an East-West struggle for geopolitical influence.

As Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid emphasized, in substance, throughout his long African tour, falling into this trap would mean driving the continent into bankruptcy, because the continent's particular problems would slip from its control and be defined without its knowledge or participation, in short the continent would no longer be master of its destiny. In a speech at Dar es Salaam, the Algerian president said: "In this context--a context which implies that Africa should obstinately refuse any military alliances with extra-African powers--nonalignment is apparently much more than a choice or political stance which, by dint of being formulated without consequence, would amount to no more than a pretext. Nonalignment is our sole means of salvation, Africa's sole means of salvation if it wants to maintain its true identity, its sovereignty, and its integrity. In other words, it is high time, in this period of conflict and tension for Africa, to regain our self-control, close ranks, and transcend false cleavages."

There is no doubt that the Chadian problem lies within the scope of this overall struggle by Africa for full control of its destiny. Likewise, the search for a solution with which to thwart the threats of a new war and new schemes of reconquest must be conducted within the scope of that same struggle.

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
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES ALLEGEDLY NEEDS SOUTHERN AFRICAN MINERALS

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 pp 43-44

[Text]



SOME CALL it the Gulf of Minerals, a vast area stretching from the Republic of South Africa north to Zaire. This area comprises some eight million square kilometres, more than 70 million people, and what is probably the world's single largest concentration of invaluable mineral wealth.

Together, the countries of this region produce most of the world's gold, diamonds, platinum, chrome, manganese and a significant share of its uranium, coal, nickel, copper, cobalt and numerous other metals and minerals essential for industrial production in the developed world.

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In fact, so essential are South African minerals to industrially developed economies that some analysts say that the inevitable race for possession of strategic minerals there might become as critical to developed nations as oil supplies have been in recent years.

American observers view this prospect with increasing alarm. One mineral industrialist describes Southern Africa as "probably the most critical piece of ground as far as non-fuel minerals are concerned."

Critical minerals

Others have gone further. United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig has spoken of "the era of the resource war" as having started in anticipation of increasing competition with the Soviet Union for hegemony over sources of vital minerals.

And American Congressman Jim Santini, chairman of the House Mining Sub-Committee, has said the US has become "dangerously dependent on Southern African sources for critical minerals", with the *Washington Star* echoing that "American industry can be brought to a standstill by the lack of materials such as those we get from Zaire, Zimbabwe and South Africa."

Indeed, Southern African minerals are indispensable to modern industries. Santini noted that "without chromium or cobalt we cannot build an automobile, a computer, a cutting tool or other high technology equipment. We could not run a train or process food under present laws and we could not build an oil refinery or a power station."

Manganese is essential to production of steel, transport and construction equipment and heavy machinery. Copper is a vital component in electronics and communications technology.

Chromium is particularly vital. It is an irreplaceable ingredient in stainless steel and high-temperature resistant alloys. It is used in oil exploration and production, in the production of automobiles, aircraft, jet engines, tanks, chemical equipment and nuclear reactors.

A West German Foreign Office study in 1978 cautioned that "a one-third fall in the supply of chrome to West Germany could within a few weeks cut a quarter of German industrial production and cost the country seven-million jobs."

While today South Africa and Zimbabwe produce about 40 per cent of the world's chrome, they hold 95 per cent of its reserves.

Because of these significant figures, traders are expecting intensified competition, particularly between the US and the Soviet Union, to stockpile large amounts of these strategic minerals as insurance in time of war or political upheavels. This competition should push up prices, lagging because of the world recession - a development that should bolster the morale of hard-pressed developing states in the region.

In March, Japan bought almost 15,000 tons of aluminium for stockpiling. A similar plan by West Germany has collapsed, while France has offered 10-year bonds for strategic mineral purchases.

But others see new dangers for the sovereignty of the nations of the region. The US National Strategy Information Centre, a Right-wing private organisation, produces *Bulletin from the Resource War* which claims that the Soviet Union is working to implement a cut-off of strategic minerals from Southern Africa to the US "for which there are no adequate substitutes and no other adequate sources of supply". Though this allegation has not been confirmed, it is clearly pointed at the more radical states in the region, notably Angola, Mozambique and possibly Zimbabwe, all of whom have ties with Moscow.

Observers note that this insistence on the crucial importance of Southern African minerals is being floated to rally Western public support for maintaining the *status quo* in South Africa. The new Reagan Administration, which seems particularly determined in this regard, has already torpedoed the idea of United Nations sanctions against the South African economy on the grounds they would produce "counter-productive" interference in South Africa's internal affairs.

Interests protected

Significantly, it would be Western interests operating in South Africa which would also be hurt by such measures. These interests are therefore protected by the Western anti-sanctions position.

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Over half of the foreign investment in South Africa's \$11-billion-a-year minerals industry is British, while another 20 per cent is American. West Germany, France and Japan remain important investors.

British and American interests control almost half of the shares of South Africa's largest mining finance house, Anglo-American, and participate in the exploitation of black workers in the gold mines. The giant US firm Newmount Mining obtains almost 30 per cent of its income from its South African holdings, which include mines producing copper, vermiculite, iron and coal. The reported rate

of profit in these holdings is some three times that of US mining investment in the rest of Africa, largely because the black work-force in South Africa receives such low wages.

Several recent events seem to indicate that a new phase is coming in the struggle for Southern Africa. For instance, heightened aggressiveness on the part of South Africa as seen in its scuttling of the Geneva conference on Namibia, raids into Angola and Mozambique and the reported sighting of a "nuclear flash" off the South African coast●

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICAN LABOR DEVELOPS CLOUT

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 pp 46-47

[Article by Henry Freedman]

[Text]

IT SEEMS an age since the first generation of African "socialists", men like Julius Nyerere and Tom Mboya, held out the promise of a return, after independence, to the supposed classless equality of Africa's pre-colonial past.

"We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy", said Nyerere in his famous *ujamaa* speech almost 19 years ago. "Both are rooted in our past, in the traditional society which produced us."

Few today would give much credence to this romantic vision of the past, a kind of Garden of Eden ideal which ignored the existence of slavery and other more subtle forms of class relations in most pre-colonial African societies.

Certainly no such idyllic society has been re-created anywhere in Africa since the departure of the colonial powers, not even in the countries ruled by African "socialists".

Romantic notions

Had they been alive in the early 1960s, Marx and Engels would doubtless have taken to pen and paper to contest their assertions in the same way that they debunked the romantic notions of 19th century Russian socialists who turned for inspiration to the communal traditions of the Russian village.

There could be no return to "primitive communism", they argued then. The clock of history could not be turned back,

and modern socialism would be the creation not of peasants but of a new class, the wage-earning proletariat, spawned by modern capitalism.

In Africa, the colonial powers introduced new capitalist relations of production on a hitherto unknown scale. Wage labour was generated for the new mines, settler farms and, later, factories, by a host of measures. Taxes were imposed, not only to pay for the colonial administrations and their armies, but to force Africans to leave their villages and work for a wage. In some countries, such as the old Rhodesia, the settlers' expropriation of much of the best farmland forced destitute Africans to sell their labour; in others, draconian forced-labour laws permitted the conscription of African labour by colonial governments and companies.

Of course, the degree of penetration of modern capitalism was and remains uneven; and pre-capitalist relations of production remain widespread in countries where most of the farmland was not seized by white settlers. But, during the 20th century, a sizeable African proletariat has arisen in many parts of the continent.

This social evolution has advanced furthest in the heavily-industrialised apartheid state of South Africa and in the Mediterranean countries of North Africa. In South Africa, a majority of the 21-million Africans live in the urban areas and the white commercial farming areas and most of the 10-million who

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inhabit the deprived homelands also depend on the wages of relatives working in the mines, farms and factories of "white" South Africa.

In Egypt there are now 9.4-million employees, of whom 1.4 million work in manufacturing industries. This sector alone employs 329,000 workers in Tunisia, 144,700 in Zimbabwe and 138,400 in Kenya. In Zambia, there are 56,000 copper miners among the 360,000 registered employees in the country, and by 1990 the World Bank predicts that more than 50 per cent of Zambians will be living in the urban areas.

It was once argued, by Frantz Fanon among others, that African workers, or at least those with a secure job, could not become a revolutionary force because, it was said, they constituted a privileged "labour aristocracy", with interests that pitted them against the rural peasants, the urban unemployed and semi-employed, and migrant and casual workers.

The theory was encouraged by the prominent role of peasants in such prolonged revolutionary wars as those in China, Vietnam, Algeria and, later, the Portuguese colonies.

But, in fact, in many African countries workers and trade unions played a prominent part in the struggle against the colonial powers before independence and, since then, have often been in conflict with the new governing elites.

The first important African trade unions were founded in the 1940s, except in South Africa, where the first black unions had been formed two decades earlier. It was in 1940 that the first trade union was registered in Nigeria; and, by 1942, there were 63 registered unions there, with a claimed membership of 21,000.

Their potential power was demonstrated when, in 1945, they organised a general strike that lasted 44 days in Lagos and 52 in the rest of the country. In Ghana, the railway workers staged a successful strike in 1940 and there was a general strike in 1950. In January 1945, there was a general strike in pursuit of wage demands in Uganda.

Ethnic links

Lack of funds and poor leadership, however, often weakened African unions, both before and after independence.

Factionalism and union splits have sometimes been chronic.

There have been splits within industries along craft lines and between low and high paid grades of employees, and even along ethnic or religious lines. In Nigeria, vertical ethnic links between narrowly ethnic-based unions and management have sometimes barred the broad mobilisation of workers, even in a single industrial enterprise, along unified cross-ethnic lines.

The divisions have often been fanned by the rivalries of ambitious union leaders who see their union activities as providing a springboard to political careers or, in the most corrupt of cases, the opportunity to receive pay-offs and favours from employers.

One well-known Kenyan trade union official has been nicknamed "Gin and Tonic" because of his hobnobbing with the world of officialdom and management.

By far the biggest problem facing African trade unions has been State interference.

"Since independence, the trade union movement in Africa has had a rough existence," Wogu Ananaba, a Nigerian trade unionist, has noted. "Laws and policies which violate international labour standards abound in most African states. *Bona fide* trade union organisations have ceased to exist in many countries, and have been replaced by outfits created or sponsored by governments, politicians or military leaders.

"Trade unionists have been arrested and jailed without trial; some have been detained for months or years, and some have been shot in cold blood."

The more subtle of post-colonial governments have used the carrot, as well as the stick, buying off trade union leaders with offers of jobs in the State administration or handsome salaries as the heads of government-sponsored and controlled unions.

But, whatever the methods employed, the objectives are much the same. One has often been to retain the confidence of Western investors.

This year, on January 4, for example, President Dacko of the Central African Republic cited the need to retain investor confidence when he told leaders of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Centrafricains* (UGTC: General Union of Central African Workers) that he had

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decided to suspend the right to strike for the whole of 1981.

The fact that in many African countries the State is the major employer has tended also to make governments react sharply to assertive trade unionism. Wage disputes threaten to affect government spending plans directly and often massively.

Rights curbed

However, political considerations are often paramount in government attitudes. Against a backdrop of acute economic difficulties, ethnic rivalries and other challenges, most African governments and military juntas do not feel sufficiently confident of popular support to risk allowing free trade unionism. In most countries, trade union rights have been curbed along with other democratic freedoms. Unions, like the Press, have been caught in the drift towards authoritarian rule.

In curtailing union rights, African governments have made use of and extended the restrictive legislation enacted by their colonial predecessors. In the Ivory Coast, the militant pan-African *Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN: General Union of Workers of Black Africa) was crushed in 1959, on the eve of independence, its leader, Yao Ngo, being deported to Guinea and 12 other of its leaders being arrested. The Government set up a tightly controlled official union federation in its place, the *Union Générale des Travailleurs de la Côte d'Ivoire* (General Union of Workers of the Ivory Coast).

Similar moves were taken elsewhere. In Niger, for example, the government banned all meetings of UGTAN in March 1960 and then dissolved the federation the following August on the grounds that it constituted a "potential danger to public order." In Togo, the military regime of General Gnassingbe Eyadema dissolved the old unions and set up a new *Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Togo* (CNTT) National Confederation of Workers of Togo as an industrial arm of the army-created *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT: Tongolese People's Rally) in 1973.

In some cases, trade unionists have been brutally repressed. In Guinea, for example, the leaders of the teachers' union were jailed in 1961 for terms ranging from three to ten years for

"conducting subversive activities" because they campaigned for a salary review. In Benin, the "Marxist" military government's police shot dead several trade unionists when unions staged strikes in June 1975 to demand President Kerekou's resignation. After the disturbances, the government set up a loyalist union federation, the *Union Nationale des Syndicats de Dahomey* (UNSD: National Union of Trade Unions of Dahomey).

In Malawi, several trade unionists were killed or forced to go into exile when President Banda clamped down on the radical faction of the Malawi Congress Party, led by Henry Chipembere and Kanyama Chiume, in 1964. A year later the MCP adopted a resolution at a party congress which led to the compulsory affiliation of the unions to the MCP, which acquired the power to veto all union appointments.

An eloquent example of the policy of a self-proclaimed African socialist regime to trade unionism is given by Tanzania's labour record since independence. There, after an army mutiny over pay in 1964, the government adopted a law, known as the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, the result of which a new government-sponsored federation was formed.

NUTA for short, it was affiliated directly to the ruling Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and assigned the task of promoting government and TANU policies to union members. All its principal officials, including the president and his deputy, were to be appointed by President Nyerere. He decided to appoint Minister of Labour Michael Kamaliza NUTA's first general secretary.

Some 200 trade unionists had previously been arrested at the time of the army mutiny and some of them remained detained without trial until 1966.

The performance of the Ethiopian *Derg*, which has proclaimed its attachment to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, is equally illustrative of the fears of even the most radical-appearing African governments when faced by militant trade unions.

Workers' demands

The Ethiopian Confederation of Labour Unions (CELU), which had been set up in April 1963 and grew rapidly in

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membership in the dying days of the Haile Selassie dictatorship, was dissolved in May 1975, after the detention of most of its leaders in September 1974, as a result of its calls on the *Derg* to satisfy workers' demands and hand over power to civilians. The military junta set up a government-controlled organisation in its place, the AIEthiopia Trade Union.

However, despite this rather generalised picture of repression, workers have not been cowed in many countries. In Nigeria, for example, there were 800,000 unionised workers by 1976 and, according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), there were 132 industrial

disputes in that country in 1979, involving 173,309 workers and the loss of 1,309,361 work-days.

Labour relations in Zambia reached an unprecedented state of turbulence in January this year, when, strikes by miners, teachers and bank workers posed one of the most serious challenges to President Kenneth Kaunda since independence in 1964.

Despite the repression militant workers face in many parts of Africa, the signs are that labour will be moving increasingly to the forefront of the continent's politics in the decade to come●

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICA STUDIES NEW TRANSPORTATION LINKS

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 p 38

[Text]

IT IS almost inconceivable that after two decades of independence, most neighbouring African countries still seem isolated from one another because of the exasperating absence of direct communications. Africa, because of its underdevelopment, is the least physically integrated continent.

Not only has poor transport hindered development, it has strangled food relief to hard-hit regions since existing networks cannot handle massive consignments. Now states in eastern and central Africa are mapping out plans to overcome these chronic transport limitations.

With this realisation in mind, Ministers of Transport and Communications from Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania held a two-day consultative meeting at Arusha in February to rationalise the views of their respective countries on important points relating to regional transport and communications facilities.

The ministers deliberated mainly on surface transport facilities and infrastructure, and established priority projects for the development of a central transportation corridor to the Indian Ocean.

The bottleneck

The planned corridor embraces major inter-state routes, either existing or proposed, from the eastern flank of Zaire through Burundi, Rwanda and a part of southern Uganda to the sea ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga in Tanzania.

In reviewing the existing transportation system, the meeting identified major bottlenecks and agreed on specific reg-

ional projects to be undertaken to improve them.

Implementation of the projects is considered too gargantuan a task to be undertaken by these countries on their own, so attempts to seek potential donors are underway. Before the end of April, the approved projects will have been submitted for consideration to the European Economic Community (EEC) in Brussels.

Priority targets to be improved on strengthening the corridor include the Dar es Salaam port, the Dar es Salaam-Kigoma railway line (also referred to as the central line) and the transport system on Lake Tanganyika, which serves Tanzania, Zaire and Burundi. The lake system envisaged will upgrade the ports and a ferry will be installed as well as other terminal facilities.

It was proposed that three new railroads should be built. One would branch off the central line and pass through Burundi and Rwanda. Another new track is to start in western Rwanda and run through the capital city Kigali, then on to Lake Victoria. The Tanga line is to be extended from Arusha through Tanzania's famous Serengeti National Park to Musoma port on Lake Victoria. Another project is the construction of the seven-highway network covering mainly Burundi and Rwanda and the westernmost region of Tanzania.

Besides the semi-enclaved and mineral-rich Zaire, which greatly relies on the central corridor to export her copper ingots, the primary agricultural and cattle-raising areas of Rwanda,

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ANGOLA

DIFFICULTIES, PROSPECTS OF ENERGY SECTOR

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1437

[Excerpts] The production of a number of Angolan industrial enterprises has been affected by the insufficient energy supply. Various measures are being considered to confront this situation: increase installed capacity and improve the distribution network. Minister Pedro Van Dunem (Loy) recently stated to the press that the authorities are thinking of connecting the northern and central networks and later install a line that will allow a connection between the central and southern systems.

It should be kept in mind that Angola's production of electricity is based on large but localized units, and it is necessary to transport power to the consumers. The establishment of various enterprises will take place this year and the necessary technical assistance contracts will also be signed in order to implement this vast program.

The electrification of rural zones is particularly important for Angola since agriculture is the foundation of Angola's development. No adequate provisions were made in this field during the colonial period and there are few rural areas where people enjoy the benefits of electricity. The various sized generators installed in villages and towns are, for the most part, in a state of disrepair, and some were totally destroyed during the war. It is estimated that no more than one-fourth of installed equipment is presently in operation.

Authorities are studying a project to install a factory for the repair and maintenance of generators, transformers and other equipment. They also intend to install "microplants" which will produce low-cost energy and require minimum maintenance by lesser-qualified personnel than that employed in larger plants.

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

BUTANE GAS PRODUCTION--A total of 150,000 bottles of butane gas will be made available on the Angolan market as of the second semester of this year. This was announced by Carlos Pinto Nogueira, director of domestic marketing for SONANGOL [National Angolan Fuel Company], who stated that this will boost the country's supply. It is estimated that 23,000 tons will be distributed in 1981, compared to 19,000 in 1980. The company intends to install a new system to fill the bottles. Present monthly production amounts to 1,080 tons and will rise to 13,000 in 1981. The difference between production and distribution (10,000 tons) of gas will be made up through imports. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1437] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

DROUGHT AFFECTS CORN HARVEST--The commission responsible for realization of the "national corn harvest campaign" in Angola expects an output of 17,440 tons in the eight provinces of Uige, North Cuanza, Malanje, South Cuanza, Huambo, Bie, Moxico, and South Lunda, where the total area planted is 12,740 hectares. The provinces of Huila and Benguela, traditionally highly productive, have had their output endangered by drought. Their harvests are therefore not included in the above-mentioned tonnage; they are estimated at 7,500 tons for Huila and 6,000 for Benguela, on the basis of the areas planted. At the beginning of the last decade, Angolan corn production exceeded 150,000 tons. [Text] [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1319] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 12149

AIRCRAFT PURCHASE--The Boeing Company, in Seattle, announces the sale of three Boeing 737 medium range passenger aircraft to TAAG [Air Transportation of Angola] [Text] [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1319] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 12149

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CAMEROON

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN OIL SITUATION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1253

[Text] Oil and gas discoveries in Cameroon recently announced by the French companies Total and Elf confirm this country's new status as a member of the exclusive club of black African oil powers, alongside Nigeria, Gabon, Congo, and Angola.

Oil production, which only started in November 1977, should exceed 4 million tons in 1981, compared to 2.8 in 1980 and 1.7 in 1979. In addition, Cameroon can count on its natural gas reserves, which according to experts with the companies are going to be at least 200 billion cubic meters, though assessments are still in progress.

Suddenly faced with this wealth, the authorities of this country of 8 million inhabitants, and first of all President Ahmadou Ahidjo, appear determined to keep cool heads. "While it may be an asset, oil is still a factor of inflation and above all of disorganization," a high-ranking Yaoundi official said recently. "The oil mirage has already taken its toll in other African countries, especially in the collapse of agricultural production and the massive exodus of rural populations to the cities."

Elf-Aquitaine is presently producing all Cameroonian oil through its subsidiary Elf-Serepca, in a majority (51-49 percent) partnership with Pecten, a subsidiary of Shell Oil U.S. The French group, which has been in the country since 1951, has already invested Fr 3.4 billion (Fr CFA 170 billion) and sees the trend accelerating, with Fr 1.2 billion (Fr CFA 60 billion) anticipated for the current year alone.

The United States is the biggest purchaser of Cameroonian oil. France itself bought only 300,000 tons in 1980. Cameroon's ambitions in the oil domain are not meager: President Ahidjo himself recently told a group of French journalists that production could reach 7 to 8 million tons per year, or twice the current level.

For the moment, since 1 January 1980 Cameroon's National Hydrocarbons Corporation has been holding a 60 percent share in Elf's crude production operations. But the Yaounde government intends to move still further toward taking control of its resources by creating a national company to exploit them. Cameroon has not as yet applied for membership in OPEC, an organization two of whose members are its neighbors, Nigeria and Gabon.

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In terms of its energy policy, Cameroon is also studying the possibilities of exploiting its natural gas wealth. In July 1980, a company--Private Research Company for the Exploitation of Cameroonian Natural Gas (GEGAZCAM)--was created with equal participation by Cameroon's National Hydrocarbons Corporation, Elf, Pecten, Total, and Mobil. A decision should be made toward the end of 1982 on possible construction of a liquefaction plant.

Cameroon should soon begin operating a refinery in the Victoria region in the west. Its initial capacity is to be 2 million tons per year, and it represents an investment of Fr 1.4 billion (Fr CFA 70 billion). The stock of this refinery located at Cap-Limboh is primarily (two-thirds) held by the Cameroonian state, with other participants being Shell, Elf and Total (8 percent each) and Mobil (10 percent).

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

OPPOSITION SAID TO FEAR THE WORST FROM DACKO

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 Apr-10 May 81 p 57

[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] While the opposition tries to coordinate its activity in light of the upcoming legislative elections, in which it expects to deal a decisive blow to the government that emerged from "Operation Barracuda" and from the sham balloting of 15 March,--David Dacko, "the Elysee's man," whose election to the presidency was the subject of a challenge based on innumerable irregularities (use of threats and pressure, theft of ballot boxes, utilization of the French army of occupation as a means of intimidation, etc.) is doing his job in double quick time.

On 4 April, he presented his new government, a government at his command, composed basically of opportunistic technocrats whose prime minister, Simon Narcisse Bozanga, former ambassador of the "Bokassa empire" in Libreville (from 1978 to 1979) is one of his most zealous servitors (as he proved, according to the rumors floating around, during the presidential election campaign). Finally, on 7 and 8 April was convened in great haste the first special congress of the Central African Democratic Union (UDC), which was established in record time in early 1980 in the mold of Bokassa's old single party, MESAN [Movement for the Social Development of Black Africa]. The basic purpose of its meeting: to try to efface the profound malaise created by the mystifying operation of 15 March, and to establish the authority of a "president whose legitimacy is doubted now more than ever." Under these conditions, the opposition that emerged from the electoral process fears the worst. This is why Ange Patasse, president of MLPC (Central African People's Liberation Movement), has accused David Dacko of having designed, /"with the Elysee's agreement,"/ a plan to liquidate Central African political leaders. According to the same source, mercenaries have supposedly been recruited to this end, and even been set up on the head of state's own farmland. And, though the state of siege has been lifted, the opposition is also denouncing the harassment and arbitrary arrests to which it is subject.

One of the basic goals of the Provisional Political Council (CPP) created on 2 April by the four opposition candidates (Abel Gouraba of the FPO [Ubangi People's Patriotic Front] -Labor Party, Henri Maidou of the PRP [People's Revolution Party?], Ange Patasse of the MLPC, and Francois Pehoua, which has just created his own movement, the Independent Thought Group, is to struggle step by step to try to preserve the /"democratic gains that came from the struggle of the Central African people."/

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The CPP, which defines itself as a /"common organ of discussion, deliberation, and decision, within which each party will maintain its own independence,"/ proposes to /"contribute to safeguarding peace, unity, and national independence, to defend the democratic principles spelled out in the constitution, and to be vigilant with respect to individual and community freedom."/

It should be noted, finally, that whereas Ange Patasse asserts his opposition to the occupation of his country by /"any foreign force,"/ Francois Pehoua for his part considers that the mission of the Bangui "barracudas" is /"finished,"/ and that their continuation in the capital could accomplish nothing but to keep alive among Bangui citizens the /"feeling of being besieged."/

Thus Giscard's policy in Central Africa goes from bad to worse, and the trap is closing further every day on the continent's "restabilizers."

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

FAMINE REPORTED--Various Comoran sources report the continued existence of a famine which has been raging for several weeks in the region of Nyumakele, on the Island of Ndzuani. The very precarious living conditions of the population in that region--poor peasants, tradesmen, and farm workers--were severely aggravated as a result of the rainfall and the winds that devastated the harvests. But the outbreak of such a disaster as well as its seriousness are especially due to the acute state of economic and social crisis into which the entire country has been plunged, including interruption in shipments of imported daily necessities (rice, sugar, flower, etc.), skyrocketing prices, blackmarket, inflation, etc. Parallel to this, the months without wage payments are dragging on interminably. No social segment has been spared. The workers, like the peasants, are most hard-hit by the crisis. Their demands run into an absolutist and repressive government run by the mercenaries of the "atrocious" Bob Denard. The Moroni government has been trying very hard to correct the effects of the crisis while continuing to draw on public assets and international aid. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11 May 81 p 19] 5058

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FORMER DISSIDENTS APPOINTED--Viriato Pan and Marcelino Delgado, opponents of former President Luis Cabral who was overthrown on 14 November 1980, were appointed respectively attorney general and director general of the Ministry of Trade and Fisheries by the council of ministers of Guinea-Bissau on 21 May. Viriato Pan had been living in exile in Portugal until the coup d'etat, while Marcelino Delgado had been jailed in Bissau and was only released after the change of regime. Moreover, the council of ministers appointed Augusto Pereira da Graca ambassador to Moscow. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1476] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

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IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

OFFICIAL: CIL NO PANACEA--Henri Konan Bedie, president of the Ivorian National Assembly, opened the first ordinary session of the 6th legislature on 1 May. Eleven bills have already been submitted to the Ivorian National Assembly. They can be grouped under three headings, namely: economic activity, justice, and international cooperation. In his opening speech, Mr Konan Bedie pointed out that "on its own, oil cannot be our life preserver. Only if our new oil economy is smoothly integrated into our national economy can it contribute to speeding up our development and will it benefit the national community as a whole." [Text 7] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1299] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 12149

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS--The attorney general and the former president of the Aoidjan appeals court were installed on 28 April in their new positions as counselors of the Ivory Coast Supreme Court. On this occasion, Alphonse Boni, the institution's president, recalled the role of the supreme court, which consists on one hand of assuring that laws are obeyed, and on the other that civil liberties are respected. [Text 7] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1299] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 12149

CIRCUMSPECTION OVER OIL DEPOSITS--"We do not know" how great are the quantities of oil lying off the Ivory Coast, stated to the press the president of Phillips Petroleum Company, two of whose wells in Ivorian waters have struck oil. The company president, William C. Douce, warned against unofficial estimates not generated by Phillips Petroleum, and according to which the deposits discovered could contain up to 500 million barrels. The company is in charge of operations for an international consortium -- of which it holds 57.5 percent of the shares -- which has undertaken oil prospecting off the Ivorian coast over a 1.5 million hectare area. Last year an exploratory well in this area struck oil. Output from it during testing was from 3,000 to 5,000 barrels a day. More recently a second well proved productive with a smaller output: 800 to 1,400 barrels a day. [Text 7] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1299] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 12149

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ROAD CONSTRUCTION LOAN--A contract for a \$33 million loan to the Ivorian state by an international banking group was signed in London on 30 April. The loan is intended for construction of a new three-lane highway, 70 km long, from Dimbokra to Bongouanou and Kotibi. The new road is expected to further the Ivory Coast's economic development by linking important farming zones to the railhead at Dimbokra. It will also serve the important textile complex near Dimbokra. The construction contract has already been awarded to the British group, George Wimpey. The loan, repayable in 12 years, was arranged by the Bank of Paris and the Netherlands, in collaboration with several Belgian, British, and Japanese banks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 May 81 p 1300] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 12149

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

STUDENTS SEEK VISAS--Rush by Malagasy students on French Embassy at Antananarivo. Since the University of Madagascar is still on strike (and has been so since November), many young people are trying to get entry and (short) visitor visas for France in order to be able to register in the universities there. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 p 51] 5058

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

TEA PRODUCTION--Mozambique produced 19,672 tons of tea on an area of 15,942 hectares in 1980, while exports amounted to 18,000 tons. Mozambique is ranked 13th for production and 10th for exports of tea on a world scale. This production has developed satisfactorily: it amounted to 13,163 tons in 1975-1976, 14,169 tons in 1976-1977, 16,875 tons in 1977-1978, 18,069 in 1978-1979 and 19,672 tons in 1979-1980. The country has 22 tea-processing factories. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1437] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

FISH IMPORTS--Mozambique imported last year nearly 29,000 tons of fish. This is due to the fact that despite excellent fishing grounds, Mozambique uses most of its fleet for shrimp fishing, a product which has a high export priority. Only the activities of the mixed MOSOPESCA company (jointly owned by Mozambique and the Soviet Union) supply the domestic market. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1437] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

RUNWAY EXPANSION--The runway of the Maputo Mavalane Airport will be expanded to 3,600 meters to allow direct flights from Mozambique to Europe. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1437] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

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NAMIBIA

EDITORIAL SAYS UNITED STATES AFRICA POLICY TO BE TESTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1223

[Text] The problem of Namibia which is today before the United Nations Security Council illustrates the importance of the role which the new American administration intends to assign to Africa and the uncertainties regarding its policy toward that continent.

In the past the United States never played a "historical role" in Africa since it did not participate in its colonization, as emphasized by Mr Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state-designate for African Affairs whose appointment has been challenged by a segment of the United States Senate. The United States today nevertheless is at the very core of the discussions on Namibia and is about to find itself as one of the principal accused being charged by the African governments while more than 100 days after President Reagan's inauguration American policy toward Africa has not yet been officially defined.

Presented to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate in Washington on 27 April, the conclusions of Mr Chester Crocker at the end of his trip to Africa were to supply the United States government with the elements it needs for its situation estimate. Throughout his African trip, whose results were interpreted in widely differing ways, the assistant secretary of state emphasized the fact that his mission essentially was of course to express Washington's views but above all to consult the African leaders, naturally first of all those who are friends of the United States. In all fairness he asked his conversation partners not to prejudge what the policy of the United States might be on the basis of more or less exact assumptions or interpretations but rather on the basis of government action and official government declarations.

Among the indications of positive interest toward Africa already expressed by American authorities we indisputably have the massive aid promised by the United States at Geneva for the African refugees (\$285 million in 1981-1982, in other words, more than half of the total aid volume promised which comes to \$560 million) and the very large contributions recently given to Zimbabwe (\$225 million for the next 3 years) during the Zimcord Conference at Salisbury.

On the other hand, President Reagan himself--and Mr Chester Crocker recalled that forcefully--roundly condemned the policy of apartheid.

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How come the African states now express increasing worry regarding what they think should be American policy and especially toward South Africa, a worry officially transmitted by UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to Mrs Jane Kirkpatrick, the permanent United States representative to the United Nations?

Like the entire international community, they find that President Reagan, in accordance with the desire expressed by the majority of the voters who put him in office, decided to have America resume its first-ranking role in international relations and to assert the determination of the United States to oppose Soviet expansionism. The consequences of that policy are evident for Africa. This is a reversal of the line pursued by the administration of President Carter, as implemented particularly by Andrew Young, Donald Mc Henry, and Richard Moose. They believed that relations between the United States and any African country should be defined according to specific considerations, that is to say, the reciprocal interests of both parties, not considering the political options of the government involved. That was a policy founded generally on the same principles as those of the European governments in the general context of North-South relations. President Reagan now is viewing relations between his country and Africa within the context of East-West competition, if not confrontation. This is why the real or presumed loyalty of each of the African states to the Western "bloc" and their ability--including in military terms--to support the efforts of the United States in its desire to contain Soviet designs upon Africa are resuming their full importance.

Awkwardness or untimely statements by high-ranking personalities helped increase the distrust of the Africans. That includes the trip to the United States by high-ranking South African officers whose real identity was unknown to their American conversation partners; the statement by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, recommending that American concern for the implementation of human rights be relegated to a secondary position. That also includes the demand of the United States government--rejected by the House of Representatives on 27 April--to repeal the Clark Amendment, barring all aid to opposition movements against the government of Angola and the invitation extended to Mr Jonas Savimbi, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] leader, to come to the United States.

The motion to lift the Clark amendment had been introduced as a "question of principle" and not as a political decision. This may in effect be an ace which Washington wanted to hold in order possibly to play it to its own benefit during negotiations with Angola, without seriously thinking of using it. But the psychological impact of such a possibility of intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state was devastating.

American diplomacy however is perfectly capable of subtlety and adaptation. In view of the determination of the African leaders to consider Security Council Resolution No 435 to be the basis of any settlement of the Namibian problem, Mr Chester Crocker declared at Pretoria that this resolution--contrary to the position adopted by the South African government--could not be considered as being out. At the end of his meeting with representatives of the five members of the contact group in London, he said that his country, far from denying the achievements of the past, that is to say, the UN plan and the procedure worked out by the five-Western countries, hoped that they would serve as basis for any settlement of Namibian independence. The debate in the Security Council opened against this background.

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In spite of their efforts, neither the United States, nor the other Western countries were able to get the African group to drop its demand for economic sanctions against South Africa.

The Africans are now convinced that it would suffice for the United States to bring its full weight to bear on the South African government--especially by voting for economic sanctions--in order to make it bend. But it is not at all certain that, even in this eventuality--rejected by the Westerners since it seems to them to harm the pursuit of negotiations and since their effectiveness seems doubtful--Pretoria might soften its position. It remains nevertheless for the United States to convince the Africans as to the reality of its desire to obtain South Africa's agreement to a solution which, according to the statement made by Mrs Jane Kirkpatrick, would lead to an "authentically independent, internationally recognized, stable and democratic" Namibia. If not, the debate will be brought to the United Nations General Assembly.

In the meantime, the Western foreign ministers will meet in Rome in May. They will not fail to emphasize to General Haig that they also have interests to defend in Africa and that the absence of a clear United States policy toward Africa could persuade them to seek a different policy on their part, as the Europeans have done recently on the subject of the Middle East.

On that score, the attitude of the United States on the problem of Namibia will be a test of future American policy pursued by President Reagan both for the Europeans and for the Africans.

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SENEGAL

OPPOSITION RESPONDS POSITIVELY TO DIOUF MEASURES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 Apr-10 May 81

[Article by Antonia Blis--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Excerpts] The new path, thanks to the struggle of democratic forces, seems to be taking a positive course. However, many battles still remain to be won.

The transfer of power came just at this conjuncture of standstill and ominous tension--which was not an insignificant factor in Leopold S. Senghor's decision to retire.

At first glance, events were not unfolding under the best possible auspices. Was it not true that Abdou Diouf had in effect been promoted to supreme magistrate on the basis of a constitutional provision (Article 35) adopted in 1976 automatically making the prime minister the designated successor of Senghor, a move strongly denounced by the opposition as a flagrant violation of proclaimed democratic rights? To make matters worse, could the new president escape all responsibility with respect to the situation he inherited, when for the last 10 years he had participated as prime minister in conducting the affairs of the country?

However, even in his inauguration speech on 1 January 1981, Abdou Diouf--who had generally been considered the archetypal "chief steward" of the nation, was rapidly to assert himself and set the tone: *"I will guarantee the continuation of President Senghor's actions, and I will guide change while preserving what has been acquired,"* he said. *"From this day, I am unveiling the challenges of the 80's... The democratic opening will be consolidated and reinforced. But republican order will reign thanks to a firm, just and rigorous authority in a strong and respected state."*

States General and Education

On 9 February the new president received the leaders of the three legal opposition parties. The president--who by now had let it be known that he intended to serve out his full term to its conclusion in 1983--promised that the upcoming legislative and presidential elections would be *"just and equitable, in order to reflect the real will of the people."* And he indicated that he himself and his government were disposed to *"listen constantly to the opposition."* Was change going to get the

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better of continuity? A whole series of concrete indications showed in any case that things were "tilting" in a positive direction. So at that point, in the opposition camp, where several weeks previously, on the eve of Senghor's departure, possibilities and modalities of uniting to take the offensive were being studied, the atmosphere was more one of watchful expectation.

At the end of January, a major event marked the taking of an important initiative, especially with regard to the tensions of the previous year. This was the convocation--announced during the inauguration speech--of the States General for a free and open debate with no restrictions on participation for the 2,000 invitees, including the representatives of SUDES [Sole Democratic Trade Union of Senegalese Teachers]. Taking up several basic demands of the most radical part of the opposition, including those of SUDES, the States General concluded their meeting by asserting a determination to make Senegalese schooling more /"popular and democratic"/ by adapting it to /"national realities."/ Among other things they demanded the upgrading of national languages in teaching and in official life, a gradual reduction of foreign technical assistance, leading to its complete elimination within the next 5 years in secondary school and within 10 years at the university. The States General also recommended /"the decolonization of the university and of scientific research,"/ the gradual disappearance of private schooling, a systematization of religious education in primary school, elimination of the audiovisual method of teaching French which has been used for the last 10 years. On the sidelines of the debates, a motion was adopted which called for lifting the sanctions that had been levied against SUDES' militants and urged the latter to delay the strike it had planned for February.

However, it was in early April, on the 21st anniversary of the country's independence, that the new course was to be affirmed in a spectacular way. As had been expected since 1 January, the council of ministers adopted two proposals, one bearing on revision of the constitution, the other on the law governing political parties, aimed at creating an unlimited multiparty system. So now all political currents could exist legally /"without obligation to pledge allegiance, necessarily, to any ideology defined in advanced by the legislative power,"/ as had been the case since 1976. This freedom was restricted in only two ways. The first, which expresses the concern for maintaining national cohesiveness, stipulates that the parties /"cannot be identified with a race, an ethnic group, a sex, a religion, a sect, a language, or a region."/ The second, which might ultimately prove to be a "safety valve" should one be needed for the regime, obliges the parties to promise /"to respect the constitution, the principles of national sovereignty, and democracy."/

In order to complete this new framework, and to efface the after-effects of the past, an amnesty was decided, which would apply both to political and so-called "press" offenses. While this measure may extend to certain crimes of the common law (punishable by no more than one year actual imprisonment or 2 years with suspension of sentence), it does not in any case apply to individuals guilty of malfeasance with public funds or corruption--the government being eager to show /"the importance it attaches to the struggle against these transgressions which do serious damage to the national economy."/

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While it is still too soon to take an exact measure of the impact of the changes under way--which seem also to extend to foreign policy, where a still-timid opening can be perceived--it is clear in any case that President Abdou Diouf is determined to win his gamble, a gamble which looks very much like it has two objectives: to reinforce the regime, while attempting to arouse the spirit and cohesiveness that would make possible the efforts and sacrifices necessary for the recovery of the economy and the nation's finances.

Intensify the Struggle

This is in fact why the party in power itself is also not immune from the fresh breezes blowing over the country. In preparing for the campaign battle, which he is certainly expecting to win in 1983, Abdou Diouf has announced the renovation of the Socialist Party. With this aim in mind, he stated his determination to assure /"unity, discipline, but above all democracy"/ in the ranks of his party, as well as /"the primacy of the general interest over special interests and factions."/ And, to put an end to the practices of the past, the choice of officials must henceforth be submitted to /"the vote of the delegates at the party base."/ The utilization of the weapon of criticism and self-criticism /"to identify our mistakes and rectify them"/ will also be encouraged. This renovation evidently constitutes the second indispensable facet of the definitive democratic opening. Abdou Diouf acknowledged this himself; he believes that the PS must be renewed if the party wants to be able to cope with its competition after the establishment of unlimited pluralism.

For the opposition, the new course, though it is seen in a very positive light, nevertheless at the same time looks (and justly so) like a victory won by the struggle of the democratic forces. Commenting on the new law on political parties, Mamadou Dia, head of the socialist self-management group, emphasized in this connection that /"this is a very positive step, which could have been predicted as inevitable by even the most rudimentary considerations of political opportunism."/ This decision /"breaks courageously on a fundamental point with the heritage of the former president. Without minimizing the merits of its author, we should hail this act as a brilliant victory for the democratic forces...These latter should see in it an incentive to intensify the struggle, for there remain fundamental problems, and many battles yet to be won..."/

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SEYCHELLES

REACTION TO MITTERRAND VICTORY REPORTED

Election Results Assessed

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May 81 pp 19-20

[Article by Devi Tolwal: "The Rose and the Orchid"]

[Text] Here is the verdict expressing the vote of the French community in the Seychelles, made up essentially of diplomatic personnel or cooperation specialists and their families: 52 registered voters, 16 for Mitterrand, 25 for Giscard, and four blank ballots.

The results of this vote--above the national average of French votes abroad in favor of Mitterrand--are already grounds for astonishment, certain indications, and encouragement.

Astonishment, when we look at the selective filter, tainted by political ostracism, characterizing the choice made by the various departments of the French Ministry of Cooperation, by a personnel force called up to "meet reserve obligations," a cooperative and docile personnel force, whose favorite flower is not the rose, and ✓ least of all the one in full bloom.

Morosity for Some

The encouraging indication, next, makes us think that lassitude, in contemplation of a sad 7-year term, had the effect of a broad rally against a man and a policy, in support of a new man and a new policy. In the light of the human fabric woven in the Seychelles, that is the predominant impression.

"We can breathe again now," says the sole representative of the PS [Socialist Party] in the Seychelles, a rare bird, like "the widow" of Praslin, with considerable relief, whom one can only find on the second island of the Seychelles Archipelago, "I had the feeling for entirely too long that I was voting for nothing. Today we are relieved," he added, reassured.

At Arpent-Vert, where the Embassy of France has found refuge, the degree of assurance is less evident and the rose has made more than one official representative morose.

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During his first public appearance since 10 May, the ambassador of France, in signing two agreements with the Seychelles planning and development minister, declared that there was every reason to think that "relations between France and the Seychelles, springing from the determination of President Giscard d'Estaing and his administration, will become closer and will be continued on fortunately and harmoniously solid foundations."

"I am certain," he added, "that the ever greater understanding, which thus sprang from these untiring efforts, which I always passionately supported, will enable us to give our relations not only the friendly but also profoundly brotherly character which President Rene has just mentioned in his message which he sent to the new president of the French Republic."

This warm and open message was addressed by the chief of state of the Seychelles from Tripoli, where he was on a working and friendship visit, the moment the results of the presidential election were known.

"We have followed your positions on international policy issues with great interest," it says in the message, "especially those concerning cooperation relations between the industrialized countries and the developing countries, as well as regarding those that are fighting for their independence as well as your concern for peace and greater justice in the world."

"We want to take this happy opportunity to express to you the importance which we assign to the development of fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation between our two countries, based on mutual respect."

An indication of things to come can undoubtedly be seen in the departure of four French tuna boats for metropolitan France right after the second round in the presidential elections.

Bangui and Kolwezi

The four tuna boats, the "Aldabra," the "Assumption," the "Astove," and the "Alphonse," hereafter christened the "Noel 1," "2," "3," and "4," should never have left Brittany and, due to technological inadequacies, caused the biggest failure in French-Seychelles cooperation during the Giscardian 7-year term by delaying--with severe effects on the economy of the Seychelles--the undertaking in which the country and its leaders had placed the highest hopes, that is, industrial fishing.

Rod fishing, for which they were intended and whose merits had been highly touted by French experts, turned into a disaster whereas net fishing, discarded by those same specialists, was experimented with later and turned into a success.

People hereabouts know little about the man who will henceforth preside over the destinies of France, except for his political concerns which were expressed in public in the past, in his capacity as a politician and as the representative of one of the families of the French left.

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People pay attention to his statements on new relations with Africa which would no longer leave any room for the "barracudas" of Bangui or those who preceded them at Kolwezi.

The same degree of attention is being accorded his last declarations on the region of the Indian Ocean, declarations in which he expressed the belief that Mayotte must again become an integral part of the Comoro Islands. That also applies to the interest he has expressed in dealing with Madagascar on the issue of the islands of Juan Da Nova, Bassa Do India, Glorieuses and Europe, regarding which the Grand Island quite justly demands their return to the motherland, or the fate of Tromelin la Mauricienne.

His vision of North-South relations finally are also a matter of interest; his program of aid to the Third World, which is supposed to replace a cooperative effort which in the past constituted a combination of the carrot and the stick, with a lesser degree of doubt or less reservations expressed regarding its status as an example in the light of the experience which the Seychelles had at the end of 1979; as well as the attention which he has devoted to economic aid, experienced in the form of a knife ready to fall, combined with political blackmail which traumatized more than just one.

People also expect relations based on loyalty and respect, such as they are possible henceforth.

At the end of the visit to the Seychelles by Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, on 6 April, a representative of the French diplomatic mission assigned at Mahe, asked a Seychelles official what the chief of state now expected from Victoria. "Francois Mitterrand," the old Seychelle diplomat said. His conversation partner remembered only the "provocative" aspect of the answer, while he was insensitive to the desire and expectations which it expressed.

The bail, as we say, is now in the Paris court and it is now expected with a great degree of confidence that the actions of the new French chief of state will dovetail with the positions adopted by the first secretary of the French Socialist Party to which people in this part of the Indian Ocean are particularly sensitive.

The new resident of Elysee Palace must now take the full measure of a tremendous asset in the form of sympathy and he must prove or simply remind everybody that there is another France, concerned with the national interest and the interest of the developing world, so that the rose will not wilt as time goes on, that it will remain sound and that it will harmoniously respond to the tropical orchid, inclining toward a desired and desirable exchange.

Reaction to Mitterrand Victory

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May 81 p 19

[Article by Solofo Rasoarahona]

[Text] In a country such as Madagascar, which did not escape the blow struck by Giscard, Francois Mitterrand's victory meant total relief. "A man like Mitterrand,"

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the Malagasy people maintained, "will not send us men such as Bob Denard or men who are going to make trouble for our economy in order to create a crisis in the country." In congratulating the new French president, Didier Ratsiraka declared that he was "convinced that the efforts to be made by Mitterrand will be in line with the aspirations of all nations aimed at the launching of a new era of peace and progress."

The new French chief of state is surrounded by a team which is quite familiar with the people of Madagascar--some of its members went there recently--and it is certain that a recovery of dynamism will manifest itself in relations between the two countries, in the form of a new policy that will have to undertake tomorrow those things that have not yet been achieved as of today. The two chiefs of state have the same political concerns regarding the problems of the world today, particularly those of the Indian Ocean, and the solutions proposed for disarmament by Francois Mitterrand should contribute to promoting the conference proposed by Didier Ratsiraka to be held at Antananarivo so that the Indian Ocean may really become a zone of peace.

Regarding economic relations between the two countries, the new prospects of participation in development, which the Socialist Party had proposed in its program, gives the Malagasy leaders much hope during this period of time in which they are fighting for the country's economic independence.

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SEYCHELLES

KEY TO THE NEW SOCIETY DESCRIBED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 25 May 81 pp 39-41

[Article by Devi Tolwal: "The Key to the New Society"]

[Text] At Port-Launay, a thousand young Seychelles volunteers are attempting an original experiment in village education.

"Do you want to prepare the way to the future? For one year, you have to plant grain, for 10 years, you have to plant a tree. For 100 years, you have to teach your people."

This suitably framed maxim is the only decoration in the office of Lucia--the secretary to Education and Information Minister James Michel--who made us wait before we were received for an interview by that official of the ministerial department where things are made to move and where education is still the top priority in the Seychelles.

"We have done so many things in 1980 and we have so many projects this year that I do not know where to begin," he told us.

The interview turned out to be rather short and informal; it covered all aspects of education reform in which the NYS (National Youth Service) plays an essential role.

There are close to 1,000 young Seychelles citizens between the ages of 15 and 18 who are attempting a volunteer experiment, something new and original, in village education, launched by the National Youth Service of Port-Launay, in the north-western part of Mahe, the main island of this island group; this experiment was officially inaugurated by President Albert Rene on 1 March; President Chadli was able to visit it during his trip on 7 April. In the streets of Victoria, on 11 and 12 October 1979, during one of the biggest demonstrations, the demonstration of the high school movement, designed to play a trick on the National Youth Service project, a number of those youngsters shouted "We do not want to go on!" Even before the debate began and the final decision had been made.

Demonstration

During this International Year of the Child, the school students who had gathered at Mont-Fleuri came down Francis-Rachel Street, circled around the big clock on Central Square, the "Big Ben" of Victoria, and then met in front of the Bastille,

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the building of the Education and Information Ministry. The rumors had done their work well. But the cool attitude, smartness, and sense of responsibility of the government team formed around President Rene frustrated the violence and havoc unleashed by provocators who had infiltrated the movement.

"Do not harm a single hair of those children," he told law and order officials. "They are being manipulated and they do not realize it. But we do know."

The manipulation, among other arrests, produced the arrest of a French cooperation agent by the name of Jacques Chevallereau, the right-hand man of the Mahe police chief. The left hand was fishing in troubled waters.

French pressure following such measures--"suspension of French aid, recall of cooperation agents"--have left their mark on the spirit of certain leaders in Victoria whose stubbornness is well known when it comes to national sovereignty and dignity. This reaction at that time against NYS was, for its initiators, a defensive reflex of an elitist teaching system which is discriminatory toward a program of broad democratization, included in the platform of the Progressive Front of the Seychelles People and slated for implementation.

When the country became independent in 1976, the education system bore the characteristics of social differentiations, of class differentiations in Seychelles society, which perpetuated them by reproducing them. Respecting a social order which they had always wanted to be immovable, the ruling social strata, for their "brood," as they put in overseas French, had two tuition-charging institutions in buildings of their own, Regina Mundi and Seychelles College, respectable high school institutions which--for those who had the means--opened the way to the universities of London or Paris, the only ones that were socially "acceptable."

The others, the more numerous ones, the financially strapped, could always try to get into the junior secondary schools before having their schooling interrupted--provided it did offer the same opportunity to everybody--and joining the ranks of the unemployed. "People used to say that, if your parents are poor financially, that means you are poor in spirit. If your parents have money, you are rich in spirit. But in reality this has nothing to do with you at all." Addressing the parents gathered on the first Sunday of March in Port-Launay for the official inauguration of the village, President Rene in just three sentences, in overseas French--in the only country in the overseas French area where that language has national standing--summarized the ideological content behind the dichotomy of the past which characterized the teaching system.

That is the system that has now been challenged in the matter of basic principle ever since the country's liberation in June 1977. It has taken specific shape out in the field since then and especially in 1980, the year of the "dividing line in the history of the development of education in the republic," as underscored by President Rene in addressing the People's Assembly. This according to all evidence is a political battle of the utmost importance, featuring interests and ideas turned upside down, along with a profound reform of structures undertaken with massive mobilization of additional funding, that is, 17.2 percent of the budget going for education in 1980 and 27.2 percent in 1981.

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The Retrograde Church

Lack of understanding and reservations have to a great extent been overcome. There remains one major bastion, a rather backward and retrograde Church which is more sensitive to the colorful processions on Corpus Christi Day than the future of a younger generation for whom the government has mobilized more than one quarter of the national budget. The place of religious education in the NYS programs is its new issue here. And the sounding board, L'ECHO DES ILES, its press organ, nevertheless is silent on that issue in a country where the shortage of land stops many community development projects (nurseries, dispensaries, schools, etc.) listed in the government program, as well as the demands for the procurement of land coming from the government and addressed to the biggest land owner, the Church. President Rene even assured the bishop of Victoria that the annual income from that land--which would permit him to carry out the projects--would later be returned to him. In vain. The issue--which has reached maturity after many attempts--is still under study. The year 1980 was the year of the institution of a primary education reform on the basis of equal access to education, calling for mandatory schooling of 9 years. The year 1981 is the year of the implementation of that basic principle on the secondary school level while consolidating the innovations introduced into other aspects of education last year. The biggest increase in 1980 undoubtedly is found in kindergartens which now accommodate 90 percent of the population between the ages of 4 and 5 and which this year were opened to children between the ages of 1 month and 4 years.

The school cafeterias provide free lunches for all primary and kindergarten pupils, new eating habits are being taught there and cassava, sweet potatoes, and yams, produced locally, are joining rice, a traditional food item representing one-sixth of food imports. The structure was definitely put in place in 1980 and the basic principle of 9 years of mandatory education was implemented; but in 1981, qualitative improvements will have priority.

Created last January, the National Pedagogic Institute will be responsible for implementing an education policy in its pedagogic aspects. The year 1981 however remains the first year of the implementation of the secondary school reform and this is tied in with the implementation of a policy aimed at guaranteeing all youngsters equal access to education after 9 years of mandatory primary education; it will also be necessary to draft a study program tailored to the country's social, economic, and political situations; and it will furthermore be necessary to raise the level of education and to change a system which, year after year, allowed a large number of youngsters without the necessary skills to go out looking for jobs.

The NYS is another one of the options offered starting this year and its establishment brought about an increase of 160 percent in the secondary school registration figures. But the NYS is not just an extension of secondary school. The programs, the funds, the techniques, and the methods of education have been completely revamped. "If the NYS high school is to turn out students who will be able, in the future, to handle all of the republic's economic and political responsibilities, it goes without saying that they must learn certain things and that the way they learn must be geared toward that task," emphasized President Rene who, following the preparatory phase, kept track of the progress of work at the Port-Launay construction site.

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A new school is being built here, at Port-Launay, along with a new form of social organization, a new type of interpersonal and community relationships because, in its basic concept, the NYS is supposed to be the key to the construction of the new society. "This is more than just an education project, this is a small society, a micro-society, which the young people want to build with the organizers and the teachers. The young boys and girls will above all be concerned with domestic life, organized on a family basis in units of 15 youths, while the cluster (a Y-shaped building consisting of three units) is the link between the family and society, the place where both of them meet. Even in architectural terms, the cluster is designed to create a community spirit," explained Olivier Lebrun who, in his capacity as UNESCO consultant, helps put the project in place and also acts as advisor.

A Micro-Society

Each boy cluster is connected to a girl cluster. They are called the brother cluster and the sister cluster. They enable all youngsters to share common activities in domestic life. The second sphere of their daily life is production in the broad sense of the word, such as crop cultivation and animal husbandry, as well as the processing of products in the shops.

"Our objective is, starting as of the end of this year, to guarantee the village's self-sufficiency regarding vegetables, meat, eggs, although, I am sure, in the light of results already achieved in such a short time, we will have a surplus which we will be able to sell," noted Olcen Vidot, the man in charge of production.

Linking education with production and daily life, starting with practice and moving on toward theory and returning to practice--that is the first thing they do at Port-Launay. The second movement starts with theory and moves toward practice and comes back to theory since the village has a study center whose main purpose is to transfer the knowledge that is included in the body of existing disciplines, such as chemistry, physics, languages, or mathematics, in a lively fashion, in the form of production projects or surveys. The common trend at the study center is primarily geared toward projects starting with the needs of the young people, of the village, or of the country.

In addition to the number of projects already proposed, there is the idea of boycotting concentrated fruit juices imported from South Africa through wholesale trade as a result of the local production of lemon concentrate and squash. "This calls for a whole series of analyses, as well as research on the matter of intermediate technology, in the field of biology and chemistry, not to mention the analysis of apartheid in the area of human sciences," one of the teachers told us.

At the end of the common grouping, the youngsters, organized in a number of branches preparing them for a certificate, will select certain new lines of study, in other words, animal husbandry or fishing, to get away from the established academic disciplines, patterned according to the Cambridge system which still had the force of law. The general approach consists thus in developing a set number of capacities among the young people. Those include scientific, social, political, and organizational capacities.

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"They elect the leader of the unit, the cluster coordinator, for representation on the village committee and they will play a decisive role in its operation," commented Noella Antat, the assistant female coordinator.

The organizational team has adopted a nondirective attitude in line with the desire expressed by President Rene, constantly urging the young people to display greater initiative. The team has set up its headquarters at the "Port-Bonheur," a former restaurant facing out over the bay of Port-Launay, one of the most beautiful on Mahe, now being developed. "We are getting settled," said Florence Bestong, the female village coordinator, receiving us prior to the inspection. "We are having the usual growing pains but we are determined to finish the job."

By next year, the student body will have doubled while the architects on their drawing boards are drafting the blueprints for a new village with 1,000 spaces or two villages with 500 spaces.

Broken Chair

In January 1983, the reform of the secondary school system will have been completed and every young citizen of Seychelles, at the end of P-9, the end of the primary schooling cycle, will go on to one of the villages for 2 years.

On the occasion of its first cultural event, staged at the Seychelles College--from which the October 1979 movement against the NYS was remote-controlled--the Cuban Embassy recently presented a motion picture documentary entitled "The New School" in honor of the teacher battalions sent by the homeland of Jose Marti to promote education and information.

This college is the symbol of an obsolete education system and framed the cover page of its last information bulletin, SEYCO, in black, undoubtedly to express sorrow for an institution doomed to disappear.

No matter! A new school is seeing the light of day in Port-Launay. It will have its journal which will no longer reprint column after column of postcards sent from graduates, as if forever trying to freeze the transmission of a restricted cultural heritage whose chain has now been broken. It will reveal the traces of hesitations and hard work in order, on the old, to build the new, mixing the odors of frangipane and cinnamon with the colors of the "takamaka" which has its roots deep in the soil of Port-Launay.

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SEYCHELLES

BRIEFS

PROTEST VS RAMGOOLAM--The Seychelles foreign affairs minister has released a protest addressed to the minister of foreign affairs, tourism, and immigration of Mauritius Island. This note is in response to a statement from Mauritian premier Seewoosagur Ramgoolam regarding the Seychelles and their chief executive. The protest recalls that the Mauritian premier permitted himself to refer to the president of the Republic of the Seychelles and to certain aspects of Seychelles community life with a manifest absence of courtesy. Recalling the recent maintenance stopover by the Mauritian premier at Mahe and the good-will message which he had addressed to President Rene, the foreign affairs minister asked himself how one should interpret this ambiguous language on the part of Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. Touching on the social situation in Mauritius and certain neighboring countries, including the Seychelles the Mauritian premier permitted himself to draw a rather doubtful and hazardous parallel challenging the gains of the Seychelles government. Moreover, Sir Seewoosagur came out with suggestions regarding the chief of state of Seychelles which are, to say the least, unkind, while the Seychelles chief of state himself has never departed from a responsible attitude, concerned as he is with maintaining good neighborly relations in the region on the basis of the sovereignty of states, respect, and noninterference. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 27 April 81 p 56] 5058

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SOMALIA

BRIEFS

WFP FOOD AID--The WFP will ship 7,000 tons of corn to Somalia following the appeal made by this country to the international community to help alleviate the increasing food deficit caused by the drought. This emergency assistance will cost approximately 1.8 million dollars. The WFP aid is aimed both at the local population and at the refugees in the camps, whose numbers are estimated at over 1 million. The latter have already received WFP aid amounting to 9.8 million dollars. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1433] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

EEC EMERGENCY AID--The European Commission has decided to grant Somalia an extraordinary aid through the Lome Convention following the floods caused by torrential rains which fell after 3 years of drought. The aid will serve to lease a plane, which left Paris on 10 May with 39 tons of essential goods (notably food, medicines, blankets), as well as to lease locally a small plane to transport these goods to the various villages. The cost of these operations, which will be carried out through the intermediary of the Doctors Without Frontiers organization, amounts to 185,000 Ecus [European currency units]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 May 81 p 1433] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]

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ZAIRE

SOLDIERS REPORTED IN BORDER RACKET

London NEW AFRICAN in English May 81 p 41

[Article by Matthews Ndovi]

[Text] Zambians crossing the Zaire border now have to run the gauntlet. At roadblocks, Zairean soldiers impose illegal fines on trumped-up charges. But the Zairean Government seems to condone the racket. Matthews Ndovi explains why.

AS A bus draws up at one of Zaire's many border roadblocks, the passengers are ordered out.

An army officer swaggers up to the passengers and strikes a bald-headed man with the butt of his rifle. "Why do you have no hair on your head?", the officer rasps. "A 10 kwacha (US \$8) fine for being bald - or we lock you up". The passenger reluctantly hands over the "fine" to the grinning officer.

The next victim is a young man of 22 years whom the officer finds "guilty" of having a beard. "A 10 kwacha fine or you go in there", says the officer, pointing to a nearby building. The young man pays up.

The officer then moves to a man who is neither bald nor sporting a beard. "Why do you keep all that hair on your head but shave off your chin?" asks the officer, slapping the man across the face. Before the officer can announce the penalty for such an "offence", the man glumly produces the inevitable 10 kwacha.

A similar fine is imposed on a young man wearing a cap and dark glasses. "Do you want to look like Mobutu?" asks the officer angrily.

Eventually the bus is allowed to continue its journey, leaving the officer about 100 kwacha richer and the passengers bewildered.

They would starve

This is an example of the daily experience facing travellers entering Zaire at the Mokambo border with Zambia. Of course, illegal fines go straight into the pockets of the soldiers.

But are they to blame? If the soldiers did not resort to victimising helpless passengers they would starve because, apart from the "self-help" salaries, they receive no wages. The racket, therefore, has not been checked by the Zaire Government which posts the soldiers for up to six months at border posts without pay, making unarmed passengers the unwilling paymasters.

The majority of victims are users of the road from Zambia's Copperbelt to the Northern Province which passes through Zairean territory. At times, the bus does not operate the route for weeks for lack of passengers. This means hunger for the Zairean soldiers.

The soldiers then invade nearby Zambian towns in search of food or money, a plundering operation that has caused diplomatic discord between Zambia and Zaire. Recently, armed men in Zairean army uniforms snatched a K65,000 pay role from Mulfulira Municipal Council after gunning down a policeman who had tried to challenge them.

But the soldiers' adventure was short-lived.

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Body unclaimed

The Zambian mine police intercepted them at the Mokambo border post. There was a heavy exchange of fire and the leader of the gang was shot dead while the others fled. The leader's body is still lying unclaimed at Mufulira Ronald Ross Mine Hospital.

A similar incident occurred later at Konkola mine township in Chililabombwe. Zairean soldiers were constantly reported entering Zambia, harassing residents and stealing food and money. Zambian police were sent to the town and a fierce gun battle took place. Two men wearing Zairean army uniforms were killed.

On hearing about the incidents, the Zairean Government demanded an explanation from Zambia but there was no official reply. When asked about the border problem, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia told newsmen that he would soon meet President Mobutu Sese Seko to discuss the matter.

Essential commodities are always in short supply in the border province, reportedly because of smuggling by Zaireans.

Zambians now blame their own government for being too soft with Zaireans who, in some towns, run what is commonly known as a "state" where they operate all kinds of illegal businesses with the full knowledge of the police and other government agencies●

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

DEVALUATION RUMORS--Rumors of an approaching devaluation of the zaire have been circulating for some time in Zaire and are affecting the actions of economic agents. It would seem that the IMF has made a new devaluation--to what extent is not known--a precondition to the provision of credits scheduled for the 1981-1983 time-frame (MTM of 10 April p 1018). President Mobutu has reportedly refused to confirm the devaluation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1256] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9516

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